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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a Corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant}
Case No. 7992

vs.
M. NEPHI MANNING,

Defendant and Appellee.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Comes now the appellant, W eenig Brothers, Inc., a. Corporation, and petitions the Court for a rehearing and reargument of the above-entitled cause upon the following grounds:
POINT I
THAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT PORTION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT
3
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COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE. AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE· IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE -DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY · OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE OPERATION
OF HIS AUTOMOBILE ON THE WRONG OR IMPROPER
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE COLLISION.
POINT III
THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS
IN A DANGEROUS PR~CEDENT BEING ESTABLISHED
IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF THIS STATE PERTAINING TO VEHICLES PASSING ONE ANOTHER WHILE
TRAVELING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, AND THE DE·
CISION THEREFORE SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE
CASE REHEARD.
WHER~FORE,

petitioner prays that the judgment and
opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be permitted
of the entire case.
A brief in support of this

etition is filed

Attorney for Appellant
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F. ROBERT BAYLE hereby certifies that he is attorney
of record for the appellant and petitioner herein, and that in
his opinion there is good cause to believe that the judgment
and decision of the Court is erroneous and that the case should
be reheard and reargued as prayed for in said petition.
Dated this 31st day of December, 195 3.

.

?:
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THAT THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT PORTION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DISTRICT
COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF HIS AUTOMOBILE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT.
There would appear to be no necessity f_or again setting
forth the facts involved in this case as they were thoroughly
outlined in the original briefs and fully discussed upon oral
argument. However, it would appear from the decision of
the Court that certain of these facts have been minimized in
their application to the questions of law involved in this case.
In the Court's opinion on file herein, Mr. Justice Crockett
holds in the first instance that defendant was guilty of no conduct in the operation of his automobile which could be considered negligence as a matter of law. The evidence is undis-

5
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puted concerni~g the distance the defendant's vehicle traveled
ont~ .the plaintiff's side of the. highway. The plaintiff testified
that the def~ndant was completely over ·onto his side of the
highway and was in the act of passing another vehicle. The
defendant testified that he swung his vehicle onto the 9ther
or left side of the highway six ·or seven feet and was in that
position when he· first observed the headlights on the plaintiff's
truck ·approaching him. Section 41-6-57, Utah Code Annotated
. 1953,_ prescribes the conditions under which vehicles traveling
in the same direction may pass one another on a two-lane roadway:
· ttNo vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the
center of the ro_adway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless
such left side is clearly visible and free from oncoming
traffic. for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking and passing to be completely made without
interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle
approaching .from the opposite direction or any vehicle
overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must

return to the right-hand side of the roadway before
coming within 100 feet of any vehicle approaching
· from the opposite direction."
We have italicized ·the last sentence of the foregoing
statute tO. emphasize the defendant's acts as a violation of this
legislative enactment. There is, and was, an absolute duty imposed upon the defendant under thelanguage of this statute
to require that when he decided. to turn to the left side of the
highway and attempt to pas~ the truck which he said was
ahead of him, he should not do so without being able to
return to his own right-hand side of the highway before coming

6
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. within 100 feet of the plaintiff's truck which was approaching
from the opposite direction. The defendant said that visibility
was limited and that when h~ turned to the left-hand side of
the highway, he could see the headlights of a vehicle which
he later determined to be that of the plaintiff, and which were
seventy-five to one hundred feet away. There could be absolutely no conclusion other than that defe.ndant was guilty of
violating this statu~e. There is no conflict in the evidence with
respect to this aspect of the case as the defendant's own testimony placed his automobile six or seven feet over onto plaintiff's side of the highway and as his vehicle was a little less
than six feet in width, this meant that he was traveling wholly
upon plaintiff's side of the highway when he observed the
headlights of plaintiff's truck some seventy-five to one hundred
feet ahead ·of him. As this Court said in the case of North vs.
Cartwright; 229 Pac. 2d 871, in construing this same statute:
ttThis statute w.as promulgated for the protection of
the public and to safeguard property, life and limb of
persons using the highways, from accidents. of the
type here involved. Violation of this statute then, constitutes negligence in law. This doctrine of the law has
been steadfast!y adhered to by this court and generally ·
in other courts throughout the United States."
The test appears to be that when a standard of duty
or care is fixed by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance
has reference to the safety of life, limb, or property, then, as
a matter of necessity, a violation of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence. Skerl vs. Willow Creek Coal Company,
92 Utah 474, 69 Pac. 2d 502, 506.
Applying the foregoing principles to our instant case, it
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is difficult to conceive how this Court concluded that defendant
Manning was not negligent as a matter of law. Had this been
a jury case, the evidence would have required the trial court
to withhold from the jury's consideration the question of defendant's negligence as that evidence showed with conclusive
certainty that reasonable minds could reach no other conclusion than that defendant Manning had violated the law. The
trial court erred in not finding the defendant negligent and
we respectfully submit that this Court .should reconsider its
decision in the light of the foregoing and adopt a clear and
positive doctrine in this case which will be in conformity with
decisions heretofore rendered interpreting the aforementioned
statute.

POINT II
THAT THE COURT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUlLTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THE OPERATION
OF HIS AUTOMOBILE ON THE WRONG OR IMPROPER
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE COLLISION.
We should like to now consider that portion of the
Court's decision affirming the trial court's findings that plaintiff's driver was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. It is respectfully submitted that a
portion of this Court's optnton is particularly alarming to
8
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counsel when applied to the practicalities of the situation. It
is that portion of the decision dealing with the relative distances and speeds of the respective vehicles and wherein the
Court says that W eenig had 15 feet in which he could have
turned to his right sufficient to have missed defendant Manning. In practically every situation, the driver who turns to
the left or improper side of the highway in at)ticipation of
passing a vehicle proceeding in the same direction ahead of
him, has control of the situation. Manning had control of
the situation in our instant case. It was necessary for Weenig
to discover Manning after he turned onto the easterly side
of the roadway. It was the chance that Manning took that
created the hazardous situation for he himself testified· that
he was completely over on Weenig's side of the road when
he saw the approaching headlights some seventy-five to one
hundred feet away. The excessive speed of W eenig, if any,
may have constituted negligent driving but that negligence did
not contribute to the accident. We believe that a person driving
a motor vehicle on a highway has a right to rely upon observance of the law by other persons driving motor vehicles thereon,
and one cannot be charged with negligence in failing to anticipate that the other may violate the law governing the use
of the highway. Particularly is this true where vehicles are
approaching each other from opposite directions and the turning driver has control of .the situation. Cederloff vs. Whited,
Utah, 169 Pac. 2d 777.
In our instant case, Manning attempted to explain away
his negligence by testifying on direct examination that he had
merely turned to his left to see if it was safe to pass th~ truck
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ahead of him. We are sure this explanation was conjured up
by Manning as a defensive measure but certainly doesn't
answer the question of why it was necessary for him to completely cross the center of the roadway in order to see if a
passing could be made. We submit that the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from all of the evidence is that Manning's
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the collision.
It might be said that W eenig had a chance to avoid the collision, but that chance was remote and certainly not a clear
one. Manning's rights were inferior to those of Weenig and
the former's culpable negligence created an alarming situation
which required instantaneous action on the part of Weenig.
He. had little more than a second to react and try to turn away
from ~ disastrous head-on collision which would have surely
occurred had not both drivers been able to slightly veer to the
right thus resulting in only a sideswiping of their respective
. vehicles. We urge the Court to reexamine the facts of this
case in order to avert an injustice to the appellant which will
surely occur if the judgment of the trial courf is affirmed.

POINT III
THAT. THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS
IN A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT BEING ESTABLISHED
IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF THIS STATE PERTAINING TO VEHICLES PASSING ONE ANOTHER WHILE
TRAVELING IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS, AND THE DE·
CISION THEREFORE SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE
CASE REHEARD.
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Since this case has appeared in the advanced sheets of
the Pacific Reporter, counsel for the petitioner herein has
heard many members of the Bar express surprise~ and concernment over the principles enunciated and counsel is sincerely·
· apprehensive that this Court'.s decision, if permitted to stand
unchanged, will establish a dangerous precedent in the automobile law of this state. With our highways becoming increasingly
dangerous due to the rapid growth of automobile travel, one
may easily visualize that reckless drivers who are prone to
take a chance by passing others when the oncoming traffic
is too close for r~asonable safety, will find comfort and protec.... tion by merely saying they had turned out to see if it was safe
for passing; or such drivers may well claim that the oncoming
vehicle was traveling too fast and thereby contributed to the
collision. We .can visualize situati9ns where a driver on. his
own side of the roadway may be negligent in not having
his vehicle under reasonable control or by not keeping a rea~
sonable lookout to avert an impending collision, but those
situations would not be applicable to facts analogous to our
instant case where the disfavored driver creates the hazardous ·
condition and the favored driver has only a second or two to
extricate himself from a situation which to say the least is
terrifying. We respectfully submit that reasonable minds. could
not differ on that subject and this Court has set forth rules in
this decision which will likely plague it and the automobile
law in cases to come. Head-on collisions are ever increasing.
They are for the most part largely responsible for the serious
and tragic accidents daily killing and maiming our citizenry.
Sometimes an entire family is wiped out. Highway departments
throughout the United States are annually spending millions
11
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of dollars to divide our highways and thereby eliminate the
cause for this tragic waste of life. These were the compelling
reasons for your petitioner to urge this Court to rehear this
case and re-examine the decision in order that the law of this
State will not provide a recluse of safety for those drivers who
clearly violate the rules of the road as the respondent herein
did.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion your petitioner sincerely urges that this
Court should grant a rehearing and reargument of this case
and thereby review the entire matter in the light of the importance of the aspects of the law presented in the foregoing.
argument, and that upon such review it is sincerely felt that
the Court will be compelled to find that the trial court should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
F. ROBERT BAYLE

Attorney for Appellant and Petitioner
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